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HENDERSON Et al. (2016, p. 3) define commissioning as "strategic purchasing decisions based on local health needs, priorities and service availability, and service quality". Commissioning is based on a separation of the purchaser from the provider of the services (Checkland, Harrison, Snow, McDermott, & Coleman, 2012) . It is underpinned by an understanding that efficiencies and cost saving can be achieved through competition between service providers (Booth & Boxall, 2016; Gardner et al., 2016) and that priority setting will result in improved service integration and service delivery to at-risk populations (Robinson, Dickinson, & Durrington, 2016) .
Commissioning relies on three activities: strategic planning, contracting services and service evaluation (Gardner et al., 2016) .
Strategic planning involves making decisions about the health needs of a population, the services to be provided and capacity of providers to deliver that service (Checkland et al., 2012) . The planning process is viewed as a means of increasing equity of access to services through locating services in underserved areas and ensuring the affordability of those services. Strategic planning depends upon the collection of population health data to identify gaps in service delivery. There are limitations to these data. Wenzl, McCuskee, and Mossialos (2015) argued that service utilisation is viewed as proof of service access and health status as a measure for service need ignoring unmet need and also other factors, including social determinants of health.
Service commissioning in primary healthcare has been used in other contexts. Both the United Kingdom (UK) and New Zealand have a history of commissioning primary healthcare services. Commissioning in the UK has its roots in attempts to reduce health spending in the 1980s through creation of an internal market in the National Health Service (NHS; O'Flynn & Potter, 2011) . This involved channelling funding through a local health authority with responsibility for purchasing care for their population. The most recent of these, the primary care trusts (PCTs), involved service commissioning for populations of approximately 300,000 people (O'Flynn & Potter, 2011) . The election of a conservative government in 2010 resulted in the replacement of PCTs with Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) led by GPs. This change was promoted by the view that clinicians would have a better understanding of health needs. These changes are seen as a means of increasing the professional autonomy of clinicians through constituting CCGs as statutory bodies at the same time ensuring greater accountability to patients (Checkland et al., 2013) .
Similar changes have occurred in New Zealand. New Zealand has a mixed healthcare system with both public and private service provision.
In 1993, the national government established four Regional Health Authorities (RHA) to commission services on a competitive basis from publically owned Crown Health Enterprises (hospitals, public health units) and private service providers. In 1997, the focus shifted from competitive tendering to collaboration and the RHAs were incorporated into a single Health Funding Authority (HFA). In 2001, the HFA was replaced by 21 District Health Boards which manage health service delivery at a local level, and Primary Health Organisations (PHOs) were established as planners and commissioners of primary healthcare services. The establishment of PHOs was accompanied by the enrolment of New Zealanders with a general practice (GP) and channelling of all public funding for primary healthcare including GP services, through the PHOs enabling the development of a wider range of services (Cumming, 2016; Finlayson, Sheridan, Cumming, & Fowler, 2012) .
Commissioning in the UK has generally been viewed as making little difference to both healthcare outcomes and service delivery.
Failures have been identified in the planning, procurement and evaluation phases of the commissioning cycle and largely focus upon shortfalls in implementation rather than shortfalls in the approach to care delivery (Checkland et al., 2012; Hudson, 2011; O'Flynn & Potter, 2011) . A number of reasons have been offered for failure including the tension between competition for funding between service providers and the development of integrated care; the quality of data upon which decisions are made; poor preparation for the commissioning role; loss of relationships through restructuring of services; power imbalances between service providers and commissioners; and the prevailing culture of the NHS which inhibits market forces (Checkland et al., 2012; Hudson, 2011; Wenzl et al., 2015) . The end result observed by Hudson (2011) has increased fragmentation and service rivalries. New Zealand has faced similar issues with additional difficulties arising from the small and geographically dispersed population and insufficient funds to meet the needs of lower income PHOs (Cumming, 2016) .
| Primary healthcare in Australia
Australia currently has PHNs which were established by the Federal Coalition government in 2015 to replace Medicare Locals in planning and co-ordinating primary healthcare. The expressed purpose of PHNs is to provide "an efficient and effective primary healthcare system" through integrating care particularly for "those at risk of poor health outcomes" (Department of Health 2015). The primary means of improving health outcomes is through population health planning and service commissioning (Booth & Boxall, 2016; Robinson et al., 2016) .
PHNs do not have a direct role in service provision but rather work with existing services in both the public and private sectors to improve service continuity (see Figure 1) .
1 PHNs receive funding from
What is known about this topic
• Commissioning is used as a means of creating efficiencies and cost saving through competition between service providers.
• Commissioning is viewed as increasing service equity through strategic planning.
• Commissioning has had little impact on health outcomes.
What this paper adds
• Commissioning may inhibit service equity in Australia as responsibility for service delivery is fragmented, appears particularly inappropriate when Aboriginal community controlled services are available and in rural regions which lack services to commission.
the Federal government to commission services for their local region.
The majority of this funding is tied to specific programmes with a limited pool of flexible funding. All PHNs are required to undertake a comprehensive needs assessment to identify at-risk and underserved populations. The needs assessment and service planning documents play an important role in addressing health inequity through addressing social determinants of health (Fisher et al., 2016) . Petrich, Ramamurthy, Hendrie, and Robinson (2013) argued that the Federal system leads to systemic fragmentation and contributes to fragmentation and perceived duplication of service delivery.
The Federal system means that PHNs have to work with State and
Territory governments as service providers in commissioning services.
This is a barrier to equity of access as there may be more or fewer services to draw upon dependent upon the State or Territory government. Furthermore, the Federal system results in PHNs only managing a small percentage of the total healthcare budget (see Table 1 ) which limits their capacity to effect change in the secondary care system (Robinson et al., 2016) .
Second, Australia has a dual primary healthcare system with main- This paper addresses the advantages and disadvantages of commissioning as a means of increasing equity of access in primary healthcare service delivery in Australia. Using data from key informant interviews, we argue that the Australian political, population and geographical context inhibits the capacity to use commissioning to achieve equity of access.
| METHODS
This paper draws on key informant interviews conducted approximately 12 months after the establishment of PHNs (May to August 2016). Data for this study were collected across six PHN case study sites with varying histories with commissioning of services (see Table 1 ). The case study sites covered rural and metropolitan popula- Data were analysed inductively using thematic analysis with data managed by NVivo10 (Fereday & Muir Cochrane, 2006) . The coding frame was developed by review of four transcripts by two team members working independently and collating of the codes and is loosely based on the interview guide. Where conflicting views were evident, a third coder was asked to review the transcript. The remaining transcripts were coded by the first author with feedback from the research team. Data for this paper were drawn from a theme related to commissioning. This theme was recoded for incidents where commissioning was discussed in relation to equity. The data are presented using a letter to identify the PHN and number to identify the individual (e.g. C4 is the fourth person interviewed at case study site C) to protect the anonymity of the interviewee and the PHN.
| RESULTS
Analysis of the data identified three ways in which commissioning was viewed as facilitating equity and five barriers to equity arising from the commissioning process (results summarised in Table 2 below).
| Facilitating equity in PHNs
In identifying the advantages of commissioning respondents drew upon the perceived benefits of a market model of service delivery for improving service equity. The primary advantage of commissioning was viewed as reduction of conflict of interest through the separation of the purchasing and service provision role. Direct service provision by PHNs was seen by respondents as leading to competition 
Service provision was also viewed as detracting from service planning. A third respondent stated "when you're the doer and the contractor of different services, it's difficult to focus on … aspects of service delivery" (E12).
Respondents also saw the commissioning process as having the potential to lead to greater objectivity around decision-making concerning the services to commission. Objectivity was associated with the strategic planning process and identification of populations in needs of services and also with effective service evaluation. One respondent identified the role of strategic planning in promoting service access. "I think commissioning is going to allow us to bring a lot more objectivity into it and allow us to really focus [upon] those key underpinnings such as access" (E12). Another respondent associated commissioning with the power to effect change through evaluation of services improving health outcomes: 
| Barriers to equity
Five barriers were identified by respondents which highlight the impact of policy, population and geographical factors upon the capacity of commissioning to improve health equity.
Many respondents identified concerns with lack of funding (see Table 1 ) and also with the extent to which funding is tied to specific programmes resulting in limited flexibility to respond to local needs in innovative ways. A respondent in discussing moves to channel all primary mental health funding through PHNs stated that:
My concern is that the PHNs are provided with particular streams of funding that are the same old types of services, and they're not resourced to be able to be innovative and reform in ways that doesn't just leave us with just a few pieces shifted around the chess board. (D17)
Another respondent noted that while PHNs received additional funds to provide mental health services, they only "end up with a couple of mil-
lion dollars to actually then commission that is actual[ly] flexible" (A1).
A second concern identified by respondents was the impact of 
(B15)
To counter lack of service availability, one PHN was offering tenders which combined rural and urban service delivery while anticipating a need for continued service provision through the PHN to meet local needs in communities in which services could not be commissioned (E2).
Related to service availability is concern with the commissioning of services with limited understanding of the local context. This issue was raised by respondents from both rural and metropolitan PHNs.
A respondent from a metropolitan PHN states that "we don't want the large multi-nationals competing because they won't understand 
A final barrier to effective commissioning relates to the impact of commissioning upon relationships with other organisations and clinicians, focussing upon the impact of competition, service evaluation and decommissioning on capacity to work collaboratively with other organisations to effect improvements in health. Respondents identify "a tension between competition and collaboration" (F4) that is also recognised by service providers: 
Commissioning was also viewed as impacting negatively upon clinicians. The respondents from the clinical and community advisory councils were often service providers. One noted that in moving from being an employee of the Medicare Local to a commissioning role, they were incurring costs that were previously covered by the organisation (B16). Professional competition was also a factor. GPs, in particular,
were concerned with the impact of commissioning which might mean they lose the delivery of certain services to other health professionals.
One respondent who worked as a GP stated that "I'm a little bit worried whether some of those jobs may be handed out to non-medical people, when it's clearly previously been a GP's role to manage a lot of those things" (B9). He viewed the employment of other professions to provide primary healthcare as having: Third, capacity to address equitable service availability is impacted by funding. Our respondents identified a lack of flexibility in funding arrangements, particularly in relation to mental health, due to ongoing financial commitments to existing programmes such as HeadSpace (Ley, 2015; McGorry, Goldstone, Pennell, & Hamilton, 2016) . Lack of funding flexibility leave PHNs with limited scope to address local needs identified in the needs assessment. Responsibility for funding for community mental health support services, for example was previously administered centrally but was devolved to PHNs with respondents identifying limited funding to commission new and innovative mental health programmes (Ley, 2015) .
Other barriers relate to spatial and population issues. Gardner et al. (2016) noted that commissioning in Australian primary healthcare has traditionally been used to provide services to populations that have been underserved (e.g. rural and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander populations). In this study, these populations were identified as being penalised by the commissioning of services.
Respondents identified concerns about competition with ACCHOs for service delivery to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities. This is a reality in some contexts. Gajjar et al. (2014) stated that the Queensland government has explored the option of using services that are not community controlled to deliver care to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. Our respondents identify a formalisation and bureaucratisation of management and funding processes which is at odds with the manner in which ACCHOs operate.
ACCHOs are governed by local communities and are responsive to community needs. Current funding models require ACCHOs to adopt a proactive approach to managing at-risk populations with continued funding dependent upon meeting externally established health outcomes (Gajjar et al., 2014) .
Issues were also raised about service continuity due to commissioning and potential for loss of work for Aboriginal Health Workers.
ACCHO provide comprehensive primary healthcare using multidisciplinary teams including Aboriginal Health Workers (Panaretto et al., 2014) . Aboriginal Health workers are also employed to work with general practice to support chronic disease management (Britt et al., 2013 A final issue relates to the availability of services to commission.
Rural communities were identified as lacking services to commission and issues were raised about the commissioning of external service providers who lack local knowledge at the expense of local service providers who are unable to compete for tenders. Crotty, Henderson, and Fuller (2012) found that health services in rural communities often rely upon informal networks based upon existing personal relationships and shared knowledge to improve service delivery and collaboration. This may be a barrier for external service providers who are not part of these networks potentially reducing service access for health consumers.
| Limitations
This study draws upon interview data from six PHNs which were chosen to represent a range of contexts and service types. Nevertheless, the data may not be generalisable to all PHNs. In addition, data collection occurred within a year of establishment of the PHNs, prior to a full commissioning cycle and access to data assessing the success of the commissioning model in addressing inequities is not currently available. As such, the paper reports the barriers and enablers of equity identified by PHN personnel and Board members.
| CONCLUSION
This paper has reviewed the views of key stakeholders in PHNs of the impact of commissioning on achievement of equity of access.
Respondents identified a number of political, population and geographical features of the Australian context which make achievement of equity through commissioning more difficult. Among these are the impact of a Federal system in which secondary and tertiary health services are provided by State and Territory government; funding and service models that work against the interests of ACCHOs; and regions with limited access to services to be commissioned. All suggest that a market model may not be the best option for primary healthcare in Australia.
ENDNOTE
1 Services outlined in blue are funded and provided by government, while services outlined in orange are privately provided services which receive some government funding for service provision. The arrows indicate the nature of the relationships. PHN are answerable to the Federal government and work collaboratively with other services.
